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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-2-2(3)(j), as amended/ and 
78-2-2(4), as amended. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff Erma J. Schoney (hereinafter "plaintiff") 
appeals from the trial court decision granting summary judgment 
to defendants Memorial Estates, Inc. and Memorial Estates 
Cemetery Development Corp. ("Memorial Estates") for failure to 
present in the record sufficient substantive material and 
relevant evidence to support her causes of action. The trial 
court found that Memorial Estates did not breach its contract 
with plaintiff and was in compliance with Utah State statutes, 
and that plaintiff's other claims were time-barred. Plaintiff 
further appeals the trial court decision dismissing George K. 
Schoney from the case for failure to substitute a party after 
his death was suggested on the record, pursuant to Rule 25 of 
the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
ruling that plaintiff failed to present in the record 
substantive material and relevant evidence to support her 
causes of action and controvert the material and relevant 
evidence presented by Memorial Estates in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
2. George K. Schoney was properly dismissed as a 
party plaintiff after more than 90 days had elapsed after his 
death was suggested on the record. 
3. In light of plaintiff's request for an expedited 
trial setting, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it struck plaintiff's complaint and entered judgment in 
favor of Memorial Estates under Rule 37(d) based on plaintiff's 
failure to respond to discovery: 
a) Within 30 days; 
b) Before the discovery cut-off; 
c) Prior to defendants' motion for sanctions; and, 
d) Plaintiff's failure to either request additional 
time, object or explain the failure to answer. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 22-4-1, Utah Code Annotated (before 1983 amendment) 
Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
Rule 25(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 37(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
The above rules and statutes are set out in full in the 
appendix hereto. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff has sued Memorial Estates for damages she 
claims arise out of her purchase of a pre-need contract for 
space in a mausoleum which was to be built in the future. She 
claims that Memorial Estates intentionally and fraudulently 
delayed construction of the now completed mausoleums. She 
alleges that the buildings do not appear as she believed they 
would appear when she purchased them. She further claims that 
the purchase funds were not properly accounted for and held in 
trust during the period of construction. Finally, she alleges 
that Memorial Estates wrongfully failed to disinter and move 
her father's remains when she requested it. 
Memorial Estates claims they have either fully 
performed all duties under the contract, or that they were able 
to perform had performance been requested. Memorial Estates 
further asserts that the claim that they failed to disinter 
Mr. Wheeler is spurious and time-barred. 
Plaintiffappealed the determinations by the trial court 
that: (1) Memorial Estates was entitled to summary judgment on 
all of the causes of action contained in plaintiff's Fifth 
Amended Complaint for the reason that there was an absence of 
evidence to withstand defendants' motion; and, (2) George K. 
Schoney's dismissal from the action pursuant to Rule 25 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was proper, due to his death and 
the failure to substitute a party in his stead. 
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It is defendants' position that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion and (1) plaintiff failed to show 
sufficient evidence to support her case and withstand the facts 
and argument supporting the Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) 
George K. Schoney's death was suggested on the record without 
substitution and he was accordingly properly dismissed; and/ 
(3) the court acted within its discretion in striking 
plaintiff's complaint for failure to answer defendants' 
interrogatories. Plaintiff has not argued that dismissal was 
improper. Plaintiff has therefore waived any argument to the 
contrary. 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS A N J :. iSFOb^iluN 
Plain-ir: and Georae - Schoney originally filed a 
compla. •" :• :: - alleging: 
b) -ious Dad f a i r h : 
c) cf contrac* ; 
d) and, 
e) wion of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices 
P i : '1 (I !  = A 2 1 1 ) 
Memorial Estates filed an Answer denying the 
a 1 1 e g a t i o n s i n s uppo r t o f e a c h c a u s e o f a c t i o n (R a t 3 9 - * 14 
IE • ] a i i 11 ii I: f a i i :i Geo r g e K S :: I: Ic • i: ie j pu r s u e d 11: ie ii i: • : 1 ii s c :;»^  ?• B J: y f r • ::: III 
1982 to 1988. Plaintiff and George K. Schoney amended thei r 
c omp1aInt June 8 , 1 983 t o allege: 
a) Tortious bad faith (failure to complete mausoleum); 
b) Breach of contract (failure to complete mausoleum); 
c) Fraudulent conveyance; 
1
 :!) Violation of Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act; 
e) Breach of contract to provi de chanpl• 
f) Breach of trust; 
g) Breach of statutory t. : i. 31 ; 
h) Invasion of t n ist corp • is; 
I) Fraud; 
j) Failure to establish a statutory trust; 
k) Outrage and intentional infliction of emotioi iaJ 
• distress (failure to complete mausoleum); and, 
1) 0 1 a s s a11eg a t i o ns. 
(P , a t 292-308) (Append! x , l u i i b i t "A") 
'. , PII a ii i 11 iii ii: f a J ] e :j e ::I I I , a i • I i 11 • i f i • i * i I i II mi e 1 1
 r 
(R. at 202-204), but whei i evidence failed tu support I he 
cert I fication, it was decertified on June 24, 1984. (R. at 
7 0 1 ; 05) • " ' -. 
A. Summary Judgment . 
On December *>* i a ! e H a " ^ i.,^,**-* --^  „
 rnv 
( , txhib.f motion 
demonstrated there was insufficient evidence to support any of 
plaintiff's causes of action. Therefore, because there was no 
genuine issue of material fact at issue, defendants were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff opposed the motion, filing an affidavit 
raising new issues. (R. at 1262-1265) (Appendix, Exhibit "F") 
The court denied defendants1 motion and granted plaintiff leave 
to amend the complaint and to address the new issues and narrow 
the issues before the Court. The court, on its own Motion, 
continued the trial date. (R. at 1301) (Appendix, Exhibit ,fGM) 
On January 26, 1988, plaintiff filed her Fifth Amended 
Complaint, alleging: 
a) Breach of contract for delayed performance; 
b) Breach of warranty; 
c) Common law fraud; 
d) Violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act; 
e) Breach of contract, unjust enrichment, 
interference with easement; 
f) Breach of common law trust; 
g) Breach of statutory trust; 
h) Invasion of trust corpus; 
i) Failure to establish a statutory trust; 
j) Outrage and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (disinterment of Mr. Wheeler); and, 
k) Class allegations. 
(R. at 1312-1342) (Appendix, Exhibit "H") 
On February 11, 1988, defendants answered again and denying the 
allegations in support of the Fifth Amended Complaint. 
(R. at 1343-1357) 
Defendants had offered judgment in the sum of 
$4,000.00, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure on January 8, 1988, after the Fifth Amended Complaint 
-6-
I II mi II i i ' i l l » I In 1 II II ' " l 1 I 1 I 1 ! 1 I  l i i i i i1 1 I II M I i HI I II in i I i I i-1 I in wed 
F e b r u a r y i i , L y H H. |N, .il l l j i I (ill|i Nei t l ie i ul fer was 
a c c e p t e d . 
0. i Fet J : i i.ai : j 1  I ] 988 , ]::: i x rsi i a : .1 : t .• : • j:: ] a:ii i: ii . i f f f 3 = 'Xpr a 3 3 
request for an expedited trial date, (R. at 1 338-134] ) 1 :1: ie 
c o i 11" t o r d ere d a s c h e d u 1 i n g c o n f e r e n c e. (R a t ] 3 6 0 ) A1 though 
p 1 a i i 11 i f f s a 11: o i: i I e j s • :i ii < ::1 i I : • t a p p e a r a t t I: :i • s s c I: I 5 ::1 I i ] i i l :JI 
conference and were not available by telephone, (R. at 1360)
 f 
the court granted the request for ai i expedited schedule ai id 
set the followi ng schedule: 
Discovery cutoff, June ] 0, 1 988; 
Mo t i o n c i 11 o f f, J i i ii e J 3 , 1 9 88; 
F i n a 1 p r e t r i a ] , ] i :i i i e 21 ,- 1 9 8 8; a i: I d , 
T r i a l , ] u] } 6 ai id 7
 f 1 988 
Memo r i a ] Es t a t • E; S S I i bmi 11 ad De f e nda n t s '* Foi 11:11: :i Se t c f 
I n t e r r o g a t e r i e s t o p1a I i 11i ff by mai ] oi i Apr11 29 , 1988 , 
a d d r e s s i n g t h e i lew c l a i m s r a i s e d i i i p l a i n t i f f ' s F i f t h Amended 
Coup] a i n t (R a t ] 3 61 1 3 6 2 ) P1 a i n t i f f neve r r e sponded ,-
b y a n s we r , o b j e c 11 o n c i: r equ e s t £ o r mo r e 11 me p r i o r t o 
d e f e n d a n t s ' mo t i o n f o r s a n c 11 o n s , 0 n J u n e ] 4,- 1 9 8 8 , Me mo r i a 1 
S t r i k e p 1 a i n t i f f f s c o m p 1 a i n t a i I d e n t e i: j u d g m e n t a g a I n s t 
p l a i n t i f f , h»i .e<1 upon p l a i n t i f f ' s f a i l u r e t o answi-
i ul v i ii ii|< 11 ui II i u i I 1) i II I I II (ill u I I |JI • i 11 nl a 
e x p e d i t e d t r i a l s e t t i n g ot J u l y b . 
The p a r t i e s aq reed t o ex tend t h e Lime t o h e a r p r e - t r i 
m o t i o n s I i» ,IInII111 I I 'Ml nil I ill I Hi 'i |i 
On June 21st, at the hearing on defendants' motions/ 
plaintiff's attorneys hand-delivered to counsel for Memorial 
Estates plaintiff's purported answers to Defendants' Fourth Set 
of Interrogatories, Memorial Estates did not have the benefit 
of said interrogatory answers in connection with its Motion for 
Summary Judgment or its preparation for trial. 
The courtf after hearing argument, granted both 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. 
(R. at 1377-1379) (Appendix, Exhibit "I") 
B. Death of Plaintiff George K. Schoney. 
At the June 21, 1988 hearing, the court also dismissed 
George K. Schoney as a party, inasmuch as his death had been 
suggested on the record in Plaintiff's Answers to 
Interrogatories, (copies of Plaintiff's Answers to 
Interrogatories were filed with defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on December 29, 1987. (R. at 1217) Thereafter, no 
party was substituted for him, pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 1377-1379) 
Plaintiff argues in her brief that the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment on only a portion of her 
claims. She claims the record contains sufficient evidence to 
preclude the granting of summary judgment with respect to the 
following causes of action: 
1. Breach of Utah Code Ann. § 22-4-1 (75% trust); 
2. Breach of contract by delay; 
-8-
3 . Hi iJ,iii "In I '.ii i i I iii! I y f * M j . 11 ill in I n | i i p p e d i I MI I  I r e t 
m a u s o l e u m ; 
I. B r e a c h ^ .•-"!-r,t,-r f r availabil^Lj c£ chapel; 
5. 
it^riiiLondi . ' : . .CCIOJ : r -^motional d i s t r e s s for 
re fusa l * " * *-^  ^ p p ' ^ 1 
IMI di nl J I ! 
was not p r cp t . s u g g e s t e d ^ * " P : - - . : C : I ai\ - * v e r e £ c r e , he 
should no* * ^u u i s m i s s e d . 
The j . .L-j- . .ngs c o m a , i nn Q i ^ i , . , , . . , ; a m i s s i o n s 
arding m a t e r i a l i a r ^ . .he .n lv mater a . fcicts which were 
* • • : :::) fc i wi th 
11: 1 e d i s p o s i 11 v e in o 11 o n s a i: e 11: I o s e s t a t e d :ii in 1 1 : I e a 11 a c h m e n t s t o 
Defendants' Memorandum i n Support of Motion for Summary 
and Warrei i J Chr istensei l supporting defendants '"' Mot ion for 
Summary Judgment and those stated in the Affidavit of Erma 
Schoi ley oppc s i i: I g s aii • ill !" L ::: tiii c ii: i t . 
T h e a l l e g e d staternents of f a c t J n Appe] 1 ant• s Brief 
( = • ::i :  :: e p t i i :i g t h o s e s t a t e m e n t s f r om p 1 a i n t i f f '" s a f f i d a v i t) w e r e 
i it - :: t r a ii s • s ill :ii i i 3 c • i 11 l e • ::! t :ii • :: i i ; ;i ii 11: I • :l e f e n d a i ! I: s ' i n i mi i a r j 
] mi i : i gment f i l e d December 2 7 # 1 98 J , • :Ief enda.-.t. H l o t i o n . or 
Summary Judgment f i ] ed J i 11 Ie 1 4,, ] 988 , <'»r .iny o t h e r p r o c e e d i n q . 
Thebt • ' : are i i : t: sm ipp •  ::: r te- ::i t y tu nl n \|jpea I \ 
m a j c i . t y of p l a i n t i f f " s a l l e g e d f a c t s •. t a i e i " rom I he 
• 9 -
unfiled and unpublished depositions of plaintiff, George K. 
Schoney and other individuals, which plaintiff failed to make 
available to the trial court as required by Rule 4-501'and 
4-502 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Furthermore, these depositions have not been made part of the 
record on appeal by plaintiff, as required by Rule 11 of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Memorial Estates therefore submits the following 
statement of facts which were properly before the trial court 
and supported by the record on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Clinton and Anna Wheeler, plaintiff's parents, owned 
four ground burial lots located at Memorial Estates Redwood 
Road Cemetery. (R. at 1191-1192) On December 29, 1973, the 
Wheelers gave two of their ground burial lots to plaintiff and 
her husband, George Schoney. (R. at 1169, 1192) The Wheelers 
and Schoneys subsequently traded in their ground burial lots as 
down payments toward the purchase of pre-need mausoleum spaces 
from Memorial Estates. (R. at 1192) Plaintiff and her husband 
entered into the "Mausoleum Estate Agreement" (hereinafter 
"Agreement") on January 29, 1974, made the first payment under 
the Agreement in February 1974 and continued making monthly 
payments for 36 months until the contract price was paid in 
full in January of 1977. (R, at 65, 111-112, 1192) 
Clinton Wheeler died August 13, 1974, prior to the time 
that either Memorial Estate's mausoleum at Redwood Road or at 
Mountain View were completed, and his funeral services were 
-10-
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a v a i l a b l e a t t h e M o u n t a i n View m a u s o l e u m f and s o , at 
in i I j i m i 1 11 11I I I I mi« I m i in II | i I ii p i I N i II in I I a 
Mountain View location i. - . uaiidi ulol |R. .i - - ) 
Thi s 'was :i n accordance w*rp Agreement */hicr provided that 
:i ei it ii s :i I. i:'1 - * 
mausoleum crypt was cuir.L'.e'^:, Me:no: :a • tates would offer a~ 
*• o»-^3 > p ^3'^'- ' M r» ! nra*" iop i * ermer * ' " *r " t " ; * " ^  
-:ght • . deceased f . ei-ai..^  -eioca*ed zhe 
designated us completion,
 Qu wciiioudi Estates 
expense- f 
L^-> Meeier passed - i Met 7* "~" v ;" 
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Mrs. Wheele: -.-. ^erren * mausoleum - . .-
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* a, iew 
uu. jji.^ 1 .o i nterrec *.*.. - .an J Sunset 
-_JI^I_ _ !:*- vi„i ** • eier's fone:, 
^•'rrhasf , tndi.5 , t- ,v paces <.* -O^AI/.*.. «llt .*Ci waients, 
« WiHPiers :,ii purchased S D « *•-
Memorial Estates" Redwood Cemetery. The Redwood Mau^uicuin 4 ^  
p a r t Q f Memorial Estates' pre-need program. The mausoleum 
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remains only partially filled. (R. at 173, 352) Additional 
crypts will be added as the need arises. (R. at 408) In April 
1985, Memorial Estates also completed a 276 space mausoleum at 
the Memorial Estates1 Mountain View Cemetery, where plaintiff 
claims she wanted her spaces to be. Spaces have also been 
available in this mausoleum at all times since completion, but 
further additions will be built as the need may arise. (R. at 
74, 173, 1192) In addition, Memorial Estates has held separate 
and reserved specific mausoleum spaces for plaintiff and her 
husband at its Redwood Road Cemetery since at least January 
1977. (R. at 1191-1193) 
Plaintiff's husband, George K. Schoney, died 
February 19, 1986, after Memorial Estates had completed 
construction of both the Redwood Road and the Mountain View 
mausoleums. However, George K. Schoney was also interred at 
the mausoleum space at Sunset Lawn as had plaintiff's parents, 
Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler. (R. at 1217-1218) Plaintiff has never 
requested the use of Memorial Estates1 facilities and services 
in connection with any lot, space or contract right owned by 
her. (R. at 583, 1192) She has made it clear that with respect 
to Mr. Schoney1s death, or her own, (R. at 1219-1221), she has 
never intended to utilize the mausoleum space available at 
either Mountain View or Redwood Road, or Memorial Estates1 
chapels. Plaintiff had never made a request upon Memorial 
Estates for the use of a chapel or other facilities either at, 
or following Mr. Schoneyfs death. (R. at 1221) 
-12-
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Document Record 
Page No(s). 
Answers to Second Set of 50-108 
Plaintiffs' Interrogatories 
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes 141-145 
Counter Affidavit of George Schoney 148-149 
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes 173-176 
Answers to Defendants' First Set of 236-250 
Interrogatories 
Answers to Defendants1 Request for 251-256 
Admissions 
Answers to Defendants' Second 352-355 
Request for Admissions 
Answers to Defendants' Second Set of 356-364 
Interrogatories 
Affidavit of Delmar Holt, Jr. 405-406 
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes 407-409 
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes 582-584 
Affidavit of Paul Moore 992-994 
Affidavit of John MacKay 1189-1190 
Affidavit of Kenith M. Hughes 1191-1193 
Affidavit of Warren J. Christensen 1198-1199 
Affidavit of Erma Schoney 1262-1265 
Affidavit of Erma Schoney 1271-1274 
Deposition of Delmar Holt, Jr. 1399 
Deposition of Richard Bentley 1400 
Assertions in the Statement of Facts submitted by 
plaintiff appear to raise questions regarding such matters as 
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PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUBMIT FACTS TO THE LOWER COURT 
SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL 
FACT AND FAILED TO CONTROVERT THE FACTS 
SUBMITTED BY MEMORIAL ESTATES. 
Plaintiff does not address the trial court's ruling on 
five of the causes of action in Plaintiff's Fifth Amended 
Complaint, (R. at 12-42), apparently accepting the trial 
court's ruling on those causes of action. 
Those causes of action that are argued in plaintiff's 
brief from Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint include the 
following: "Breach of Contract for Delayed Performance," 
"Breach of Warranty" regarding mausoleum appearance, "Common 
Law Fraud," "Breach of Contract" for availability of chapel; 
"Breach of Utah Code Ann. § 22-4-1 (75% trust)," and 
"Outrageous & Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress" for 
refusal to disinter Mr. Wheeler. With respect to each of those 
causes of action, plaintiff failed to show sufficient evidence 
to support the claim, and failed to controvert those facts 
submitted by Memorial Estates in defense of the claim. 
A. Plaintiff failed to produce evidence that Memorial 
Estates had breached the Schoney's contract. 
Plaintiff claims that Memorial Estates failed to 
perform its contractual obligations. The facts in the record 
-16-
reveal that Memorial Estates has fully performed its 
contractual obligations. 
Those obligations are: 
1) To provide rights to mausoleum crypts for Mr. 
and Mrs. Schoney; 
2) To construct a mausoleum; 
3) To bury, disinter and place remains in 
mausoleum if space was not constructed at time of 
death; 
4) To make available a full service chapel; andf 
5) To place $20.00 in Trust "A" and $20.00 in 
Trust "B" to be applied to endowment care. 
Performance was as follows: 
1) Memorial Estates is holding two spaces for 
plaintiff at the Redwood Road mausoleum, and has 
space available at the Mountain View mausoleum, as 
well, which is available for plaintiff. 
2) Memorial Estates has constructed two 
mausoleums. 
3) Plaintiff chose to inter her husband at Sunset 
Lawn and has no intention to be interred at 
Memorial Estates. 
4) Plaintiff chose not to use a Memorial Estates 
provided chapel for her husband's funeral and has 
no intention to use a Memorial Estates' chapel at 
her own funeral. 
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5) Memorial Estates has an endowment care fund 
which meets the requirements of the State of Utah 
and which exceeds the requirements of Trust "A11 
and Trust "B". 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
summary judgment. Memorial Estates has always been ready, 
willingf and able to perform each of its duties pursuant to the 
contract entered into with plaintiff. (R. at 10, 74, 146, 583, 
1192-1193) Even if the contrary had been true, no evidence of 
damage could have been presented at trial. 
B. Plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty is 
without merit. 
Plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty is based upon 
the allegation that the mausoleums constructed by the 
defendants are different in appearance and quality from the 
appearance and quality the plaintiff believed they would have, 
based upon an artist's rendering plaintiff claimed was shown to 
her at the time she purchased her pre-need contract. First, 
The record contains no evidence of representations or 
warranties made by the defendants with respect to the 
appearance or quality of the mausoleum to be built pursuant to 
the pre-need contract. Second, the first mausoleum was 
finished in 1976. The claim for breach of warranty was first 
constructed in January 1988. The mausoleum appearance was 
obvious to the plaintiff from 1976, and therefore, she was on 
notice regarding the appearance and quality she now complains 
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off 12 years prior to the first filing of this cause of 
action. Third, plaintiff has admitted she is not offended by 
the appearance of the Mountain View cemetery. (R. at 353-358) 
No issue has been raised to the effect that the appearance is 
inferior in any way. Finally, the statute of limitations had 
run long before the Fifth Amended Complaint was filed 
commencing in 1976 and running in 1980. (Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25, § 78-12-25.5, as amended) 
C. Because plaintiff failed to allege the elements of 
fraud, or raise issues sufficient to justify a 
finding of fraud. 
In order to recover for fraud plaintiff must 
specifically plead and prove the following: (1) that a 
representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) recklessly made knowing 
that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party 
to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did, in fact, rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to its injury and 
damage. Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978); 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-145, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 
(1952). In addition, the plaintiff must plead the conduct 
constituting fraud with particularity, (Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 9(b)), and the evidence of fraud must be "clear 
and convincing." Berkeley Bank v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 
(Utah 1980). 
-19-
Plaintiff argues that the fraudulent conduct relates to 
defendants* representations that they would perform in the 
future by building mausoleums. Plaintiff's argument fails 
because there was no misrepresentation. Memorial Estates has 
built two mausoleums and has more than adequate crypt space 
available. Plaintiff's argument also fails because she has 
pled the allegations of fraud insufficiently. Because Memorial 
Estates1 representation relates to future performance. The 
party pleading fraud must show that the defendants did not 
intend to perform at the time the promise was made. Rice, 
Melby Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 646 P.2d 696, 698 
(Utah 1982). A subsequent change of mind or nonperformance is 
insufficient to prove fraud. Id. Plaintiff failed to show how 
Memorial Estates did not intend to perform at the time the 
promise was made. Plaintiff, in fact, would never be able to 
show Memorial Estates did not intend to peform, since Memorial 
Estates has in fact performed the promise. Finally, it should 
be noted that plaintiff never presented a submission which 
would raise the issue of any damage having been caused, even if 
her claim could be proven. 
Those facts argued in the Brief of Appellant are not 
supported in the Record. Plaintiff does not point out a single 
fact from the Record from which it can be inferred that 
Memorial Estates did not intend to perform each of its 
obligations under the contract, at the time the contract was 
entered into. 
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D. Plaintiff failed to produce evidence that the 
chapel was not available for her use. 
As set forth in the facts above, Memorial Estates has 
always been ready, willing, and able to provide a chapel for 
plaintiff's use. Plaintiff has never presented a submission to 
controvert the affidavit of Kenith Hughes on this issue. 
Plaintiff has never made request or demand on Memorial Estates 
for the use of a chapel. (R. at 583) In her Response to 
Defendants1 First Request for Admissions, plaintiff admitted: 
Request No. 9: 
Admit that as of the date Plaintiffs 
filed their complaint they had not at 
any time requested the defendant to 
provide them the use of the chapel. 
Response: 
Deny in part. Plaintiffs have not 
requested chapel space for their own 
burial. 
(R. at 254) See also Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories, 
dated August 13, 1987, 11118 and 14.) 
Not only is the evidence uncontroverted that a chapel 
was available and that plaintiff never asked to use the chapel; 
additionally, the plaintiff made a submission which would raise 
the issue of any damage having been caused even if this claim 
could be proven. 
E. Memorial Estates has committed no breach of trust. 
As revealed by the affidavits of John MacKay, Warren 
Christensen and Kenith Hughes, Memorial Estates has complied 
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with all the conditions required of it by state statute 
regarding the maintenance of any endowment trust funds. 
Memorial Estates is audited on a yearly basis and these audits 
have revealed that Memorial Estates maintains the necessary 
money available for mausoleum and cemetery construction. 
(R. at 1190, 1199) 
In addition, Section 22-4-1 of the Utah Code provided, 
at the time of acts complained of, that the 75% trust 
requirement did not apply to cemetery lots, vaults, mausoleum 
crypts, niches, cemetery burial privileges and cemetery space. 
The Schoneys had made their final payments in 1977. At that 
time, there was no requirement for any of that money paid to be 
set aside in trust pursuant to Section 22-4-1. In 1983, the 
legislature amended that section to include mausoleum space, 
but that provision is not applicable to the cause of action in 
this appeal because the last payment had been made six years 
before the amendment. Therefore, there can be no violation of 
that section as alleged by plaintiff. 
The purpose of the 75% trust requirement is to ensure 
that funds are available to provide the services promised in 
the pre-need contract. In this case, the mausoleum promised 
was constructed, the construction trust requirement, if any, 
expired upon construction. Further, the facts reveal that 
Memorial Estates is in full compliance with all statutory 
endowment care requirements and, therefore, plaintiff cannot 
claim she has been damaged in any way. 
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Plaintifffs contract contains references to Trust "A" 
and Trust "B"
 f endowment care trusts into which $20 of 
plaintiff's purchase funds were to be placed in each. *At the 
time the present parties who own and manage the defendant 
corporations first became involved/ which was after the time 
the plaintiff entered into her purchase contract/ but before 
she paid the last payment/ Trust "A" was insolvent. Trust "B", 
however, contains/ at the present time/ more than the 
requirement in the contract for "A"and "B", and the additional 
endowment fund required by the State also exceeds the 
requirement in the contract regarding Trust "A" and Trust "B". 
In any event/ the plaintiff has made no submission of any 
evidence to raise the issue of damages having been caused/ even 
if her claim can be proven. 
F. Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress must fail. 
In order to recover under an action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress/ plaintiff must show that 
Memorial Estates' conduct was "outrageous and intolerable." 
Samms v. EccleS/ 11 Utah.2d 289/ 358 P.2d 344 (1961). The 
facts in this casef even as alleged by plaintiff/ do not rise 
to this standard. Plaintiff complains that Memorial Estates 
refused to disinter Mr. Wheeler's remains which had been 
temporarily placed in a vault in a ground burial plot because 
the family wished to eventually use the as then incompleted 
Mountain View mausoleum/ rather than the completed Redwood Road 
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mausoleum. The only fact in the record is that Mr. Wheeler's 
remains were promptly disinterred after the request was made 
and they were placed in the mausoleum at Sunset Lawn on the 
very day of his wife's funeral service. Thereforef as a matter 
of law, this claim cannot stand. 
In addition, the allegations in the pleadings referring 
to the disinterment of Mr. Wheeler state the disinterment 
occurred on or before May 22, 1982. The longest possible 
statute of limitation period that could apply is four years 
from the occurrence, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25, as amended, 
even though plaintiff alleged this claim as an intentional 
tort, and the period could be less than four years. The claim 
was first made in January 1988. Because the claim was first 
raised five years and seven months after the occurrence, 
Memorial Estates was not notified of plaintiff's intent to 
raise the claim. The claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
Plaintiff claims that this claim should relate back to 
the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
contained in the Second Amended Complaint, filed in 1983. The 
facts upon which the claim in the Second Amended Complaint 
(R. at 308) was alleged were those plaintiff claims amount to 
intentional or wilful delay of construction of the mausoleum. 
The failure to disinter claim stands on completely separate and 
distinct factual allegations. The facts upon which the claim 
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in the Fifth Amended Complaint (R. at 1325-1326) is alleged 
concern a supposed refusal to disinter Mr. Wheeler, a claim 
never pled prior to the filing of the Fifth Amended Complaint. 
The identity between the labels on the two claims is not 
sufficient to tie the new set of facts in the Fifth Amended 
Complaint to the date of the Second Amended Complaint. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling 
as a matter of law that plaintiff could not prevail upon any of 
these claims, based upon the record before the trial court. 
II 
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS ARE MOOT BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 
BECAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO ANSWER DEFENDANTS' 
FOURTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES IN A TIMELY FASHION. 
THIS MATTER HAS NOT BEEN APPEALED. 
Plaintiff's brief does not contest the trial court's 
order granting defendants' Motion to Strike plaintiff's Fifth 
Amended Complaint. The ruling on that Motion, and consequent 
entry of judgment for Memorial Estates on all issues, renders 
all of plaintiff's arguments on appeal moot. 
The original complaint was filed in 1982. Defendants' 
summary judgment motion, on December 29, 1987, demonstrated 
that the conditions alleged in the complaint could not be 
proven. By way of response to defendants' December 29, 1987 
Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff requested and received 
leave of the court to file another amended complaint. It was 
filed January 26, 1988, over five and one-half years after the 
original complaint. (R. at 1312) The Fifth Amended Complaint 
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raised new issues and at least five new and additional causes 
of action, to wit: "Breach of Warranty," "Unjust Enrichment," 
"Interference with Contract," "Breach of Common Law Trust," and 
"Outrage and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
(Disinterment of Mr. Wheeler)". The new causes of action 
required additional discovery by defendants, but the plaintiff 
had also requested that the court set an expedited trial date. 
The court granted the request and set the date of July 6, 1988 
to commence trial. 
On April 29, 1988, Memorial Estates submitted 
Defendants1 Fourth Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff by 
mail. The principal fact which had changed from the dates of 
the first and second complaints to the date of the fifth 
complaint had to do with defendants1 construction of two 
mausoleums. Defendants1 Fourth Set of Interrogatories 
addressed issues concerning the construction and appearance of 
those mausoleums, which were issues raised for the first time 
in the plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint. 
The last day to answer interrogatories in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 33(a) was June 1, 1988, only a 
month and six days before trial. The last day to respond to 
all discovery, pursuant to the Court's scheduling order, was 
June 10, 1988. Counsel for Memorial Estates requested the 
answers from counsel for plaintiff between June 2 and June 13 
(Transcript of hearing, June 21, 1988 at 3), and, when no 
answers were forthcoming, on June 14, 1988, Memorial Estates 
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filed a Motion to strike plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint 
and to enter judgment on behalf of Memorial Estates for reason 
of plaintiff's failure to answer the interrogatories. 
Purported answers to those interrogatories were 
delivered to counsel for defendants at the time of hearing. No 
certificate regarding service or filing of complete 
interrogatory answers is in the record. 
Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that if a party fails to serve answers to 
interrogatories: 
The court in which the action is pending, on 
motion, may make such orders in regard to the 
failure as are just, and among others, it may 
take any action authorized under paragraphs 
(A) (B) and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this 
Rule. 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides in part: 
. . . dismissing the action or proceeding or 
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by 
default against the disobedient party; . . . . 
In the case of W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West 
Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed a situation comparable to the one in the instant 
matter. In that case, as in this case, the court granted a 
summary judgment and at the same time, granted judgment by 
default as a sanction pursuant to Rule 37(d). Addressing the 
issue of judgment by default as a sanction, the Court commented 
on the amendment in 1972 which changed Rule 37(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to correspond with the 1970 amendment 
to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and quoted 
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8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2291, page 
807-812 with approval as follows: 
Rule 37(d) allows the imposition of sanctions 
against a party for especially serious 
disregard of the obligations imposed upon him 
by the discovery rules even though he has not 
violated any court order . . . . Until 1970, 
the rule applied only if a failure by a party 
was willful. This limitation has been 
eliminated. In addition, the rule now says, 
as Rule 37(b)(2) always has said, that the 
court is to make "such orders with regard to 
the failure as are just." Taken together, 
these two changes mean that any failure of 
the sort described in Rule 37(d) permits 
invocation of the rule, regardless of the 
reason for the failure, but that the court 
has discretion about the sanction to be 
imposed. 
Gardner at 737. 
In Gardner, the defendants contended the sanction was 
inappropriate because they had served answers to the 
interrogatories prior to the hearing on the motion for a 
default judgment. The court rejected that argument stating 
that if a party fails to answer within the specified time under 
the rule, that party has failed to answer and the court may 
appropriately invoke the sanctions. 
In Gardner, as in the instant matter, the party that 
failed to answer also failed to object to the interrogatories, 
to request additional time or to explain or justify the failure 
to answer, and the Gardner Court ruled that the trial court was 
justified in finding there was no reasonable excuse for the 
failure to comply with Rule 33. The Court further stated, 
paraphrasing the case of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc. v, Echols, 138 Ga. App. 593, 226 S.E.2d 742, 743 (1976): 
. . . there was no significance in the fact 
plaintiff submitted answers to the propounded 
questions before the hearing on defendant's 
motion for sanctions. The court ruled once 
the motion for sanctions has been filed, the 
opposing party may not preclude their 
imposition by making a belated response in 
the interim between the filing of the motion 
for sanctions and the hearing on the 
motion. 
The Court reiterated that sanctions are appropriate 
whether a party has moved pursuant to Rule 37(a)(2) for an 
order compelling the other party to respond to discovery, or 
not, and further stated: 
The extreme sanction of default or dismissal 
must be tempered by the careful exercise of 
judicial discretion to ensure its imposition 
is merited. Under Rule 37(d), sanctions are 
justified without reference to whether the 
unexcused failure to make discovery was 
willful. The sanction of default judgment is 
justified where there has been a frustration 
of the judicial process vis., where the 
failure to respond to discovery impeached 
trial on the merits and makes it impossible 
to ascertain whether the allegations of the 
answer have any factual merit. 
A defendant may not ignore with impunity the 
requirements of Rules 33 and 34 and the 
necessity to respond within 30 days, to 
request additional time or to seek a 
protective order under Rule 26(c). A party 
to an action has a right to have the benefits 
of discovery procedure promptly, not only in 
order that he may have ample time to prepare 
his case, but also in order to bring to light 
facts which may entitle him to summary 
judgment or induce settlement prior to trial. 
Gardner at 738. 
Gardner applies to the instant case because plaintiff's 
failure to respond to the interrogatories impeded not only the 
defendants' presentation of their Motion for Summary Judgment, 
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but it also impeded preparation for trial on the merits and 
prejudiced the defendants by effectively preventing defendants 
from following up on their timely discovery request whdn trial 
was set to commence only two weeks away. 
Plaintiff's arguments are moot because the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in striking the plaintiff's 
complaint and entering judgment in favor of Memorial Estates, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Plaintiff never appealed this decision and 
accordingly/ it stands, thereby mooting plaintiff's appeal. 
Ill 
THE "FACTS" STATED IN PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT 
OF FACTS WERE NOT BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT AND ARE NOT PART OF THE 
RECORD ON APPEAL. 
In plaintiff's brief, plaintiff alleges facts that were 
not before the trial court and are not before this Court. 
Plaintiff has cited almost exclusively to depositions that were 
neither filed nor published, and were in fact not accessible to 
the trial court judge. The trial court judge was not apprised 
of plaintiff's reliance on said alleged facts either on 
defendants' December 27, 1987 Motion for Summary Judgment or 
upon Defendants' January 14, 1988 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 
634 (Utah App. 1987) this Court upheld the Utah Supreme Court's 
denial of a motion to supplement the record on appeal to 
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include depositions which had not been published in the trial 
court. In a concurring opinion. Judge Orme explains that it 
was the failure to file the depositions, which was fatal to the 
motion to supplement• A filed deposition may be relevant and 
material to a motion for summary judgment/ and if so should be 
considered by the trial court and the appellate court. 
Rule 56(e) entitles a party to summary 
judgment "if the pleadings, depositions/ 
answers to interrogatories and answers to 
admissions on file, together with affidavits, 
if any" so warrant. 
Id. at 641 (emphasis added). 
Rule 56(e) specifically provides that the depositions be filed. 
If the depositions are not filed/ the trial court 
cannot consider them or allegations regarding their content/ 
because said allegations cannot be verified. Likewise/ if not 
filed/ the depositions cannot be part of the record on appeal. 
In Thompson v. Ford Motor Co.# 14 Utah 2d 334/ 384 P.2d 
109 (1963)/ both parties cited to depositions that had remained 
sealed. The depositions had never been seen by the trial 
court/ and the supreme court therefore did not open the 
depositions. In a footnote/ the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
the correctness of the depositions used by the parties could 
not be known. Thompson/ at 109. 
Because the statements relied upon by plaintiff are 
cited only to unfiled depositions/ plaintiff's statement of 
facts should not be considered by this Court. 
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IV 
GEORGE K. SCHONEY WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS A PARTY. 
Rule 25(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires dismissal of a deceased party unless a motion for 
substitution is made with 90 days after the death of that party 
is suggested. 
The suggestion of Mr. Schoney's death was made and 
filed with the Court. It was made in Plaintiff's Answers to 
Interrogatories, a copy of which was filed with the trial court 
attached to defendants' Memorandum in Support of their Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed December 29, 1987. (R. at 
1202-1225) The suggestion was properly recorded and served on 
plaintiff through her attorney of record. 
Ninety days after the suggestion of death was filed 
with the trial court, no party had been substituted for the 
deceased and no one had sought an extension of time in which to 
file a substitution. Finally, on June 21, 1988, Memorial 
Estates made a motion to dismiss George Schoney as a party to 
the action. At the time of the motion to dismiss, plaintiff 
showed no circumstances which could conceivably justify her 
failure to substitute another party as plaintiff. George 
Schoney had been deceased for over 27 months, long before the 
motion was made, giving plaintiff ample time to make a proper 
party substitution. 
Plaintiff argues notifying and serving George Schoney's 
attorney is not sufficient to make a suggestion of death 
-32-
because that attorney is not a representative of the deceased 
party's estate, and that therefore, no representative of George 
Schoneyfs estate was properly notified or served. However, 
notification and service on plaintiff was appropriate pursuant 
to Rule 25(a), because plaintiff is a successor heir and 
beneficiary of George Schoney and is represented by the same 
counsel that represented George Schoney up until his death in 
this action. 
Plaintiff also argues the suggestion of death was 
improper because it was not made pursuant to Form 30 of the 
forms appended to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
"Appendix of Forms," Introductory Statement, reads: "The 
following forms are intended for illustration only." Form 30 
is not required to be used in a suggestion of death. In fact, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25(a) only requires that 
the suggestion be made "upon the record by service of a 
statement of the fact of the death." Here the suggestion of 
death was made upon the record by service of a statement of the 
fact of the death from the plaintiff herself in her answer No. 
1 found in Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories. (R. at 1217) 
For the foregoing reasons, the suggestion of death was 
properly stated, served, and recorded. Because plaintiff 
failed to make a motion within 90 days of the suggestion to 
substitute the deceased party, George Schoney was properly 
dismissed as a plaintiff. 
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V 
PLAINTIFF IS LIMITED ON APPEAL TO THOSE ARGUMENTS 
CONTAINED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
Plaintiff in her docketing statement has stated many 
issues. However, plaintiff has failed to support many of those 
issues in her brief, either with any references to the record 
on appeal or with authority for the proposition contained in 
the docketing statement. The docketing statement "is not a 
brief and should not contain arguments or procedural motions." 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 9. The stating of an 
issue without argument does not serve to point out specific 
errors or points within the scope of some specific assignment 
of error. 
Where a point is merely asserted by appellate 
counsel without any argument of or authority 
for the proposition, it is deemed to be 
without foundation and requires no discussion 
by the reviewing court. 
People v. Dougherty, 188 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Dist. Cal. 1982). 
Issues listed in a docketing statement but not briefed are 
deemed abandoned. State v. Eder, 704 P.2d 465, 469 (N.M. App. 
1985). 
The docketing statement provides the court with a 
concise listing of the arguments expected to be raised by 
plaintiff and Memorial Estates. It is incumbent upon the 
plaintiff to state fully with record references and supporting 
authority the arguments which allegedly weigh counter to the 
trial court's findings. The reviewing court is not required to 
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make an independent search of the record for supporting 
authority when the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state 
the basis of its claim. See Dougherty, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 123. 
Where plaintiff has failed in her brief to support 
issues raised in the docketing statement, the plaintiff has not 
provided Memorial Estates with a fair opportunity to respond to 
the arguments. That failure, together with the failure to cite 
the record and/or authority in support of points of error, 
constitutes waiver of any argument regarding any such claimed 
error. See Lecky v. Warren, 635 S.W.2d 752, (Tex. App. 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff does not raise factual questions which could 
in any way lead to the relief she demands. Nowhere does she 
raise any issues as to how or in what amount she has been 
damaged. She has never made demand for performance. 
Defendants were and are ready, willing and able to perform all 
of their duties under the contract. Not only did the trial 
court not abuse its discretion; but, based upon the facts in 
the record, any other action by the trial court would have been 
an abuse of its discretion. 
For a number of reasons the trial court judgment should 
be affirmed: 
1) The trial court ruling of Memorial Estates Motion 
to Strike the Fifth Amended Complaint renders 
plaintiff's arguments on appeal on all issues moot. 
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2) Plaintiff failed to submit sufficient facts to the 
trial court to support the finding that plaintiff 
could have prevailed on any cause of action. 
3) There are insufficient facts in the record on 
appeal to support any of the arguments advanced by 
plaintiff on this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JU day of May, 1989. 
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